Greece Update by Migdalovitz, Carol
1  Costas Stephanopoulos holds the largely ceremonial post of President.  Stephanopoulos, whose
term expires in 2005, is a former ND official who split from the party to form his own center-
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Summary
The conservative New Democracy party took office in March 2004 for the first
time in more than 20 years.  Its economic policies call for cutting the large public sector,
while sustaining strong growth that had been stimulated by investments for the summer
2004 Olympics.  Its foreign policy will continue to focus on the European Union, the
rapprochement with Turkey, efforts to reunify Cyprus, and good relations with the
United States.  Greece has assisted with the war on terrorism, but is not a member of the
coalition in Iraq, where it supports a strong U.N. role.  This report will be updated if
developments warrant.  See also CRS Issue Brief IB89140, Cyprus: Status of U.N.
Negotiations, and CRS Report RS21833, Greece: Threat of Terrorism and Security at
the Olympics, both updated regularly.
Government and Politics
The conservative New Democracy party (ND) won the March 7, 2004 parliamentary
elections in Greece with 45.37% of the vote to 40.55% for its rival Pan-Hellenic Socialist
Movement (PASOK), thereby gaining a majority of 165 out of 300 seats in parliament to
117 for PASOK.  The Communist Party (KKE) garnered 5.89% of the vote and 12 seats,
while the Coalition of the Left and Progress (Synaspismos) took 3.26% and 6 seats.  The
rightist Popular Orthodox Rally (LAOS) and the leftist Democratic Social Movement
(DIKKI) failed to win 3% of the vote required to enter parliament.
 Constantine (Costas) Karamanlis, the 47-year-old nephew and namesake of the
founder of ND who had served as prime minister (1955-1963, 1974-1980) and  president
(1980-1985, 1990-1995), became Prime Minister.  The younger Karamanlis entered
parliament in 1989 and has been the leader of ND for seven years.  He has never held a
ministerial portfolio.  As part of his education, he earned graduate degrees from the
Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy of Tufts University in Massachusetts.1
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right party, but  retired from politics after failing to win any seats in the 1994 European
Parliament election.  He won the presidency in 1995 with PASOK support.
2 The European Parliament is the legislative institution of the European Union.
3 CIA, The World Factbook 2003.
ND previously held power for fewer than three of  the last 23 years.  In the past few
years, however, voter sentiment had shifted against the ruling PASOK due to political
“fatigue” and discontent with perceived corruption, despite the personal popularity of
former Foreign Minister George Papandreou who became PASOK leader in February
2004.  During the campaign, Karamanlis adopted moderate views, emphasizing the need
to reinvigorate the economy to address high unemployment by lifting obstacles to
investment, cutting taxes and bureaucracy, and strengthening small- and medium-sized
businesses and farmers.  He also called for reforms in education and health care. In
addition, he highlighted the need to combat corruption.  In foreign policy, Karamanlis
promised to continue PASOK’s rapprochement with Turkey and to work for a just
solution to the Cyprus problem.
Karamanlis appointed a relatively large cabinet of 47, including a few party stalwarts
from his uncle’s era and a number of ministers from Karamanlis’s own generation.  He
offset the appointment of 75-year-old Petros Molyviatis as Foreign Minister with the
choice of the younger, academic Yiannis Valinakis as Alternate (or Deputy) Foreign
Minister responsible for European affairs.  Valinakis is seen as a possible successor for
Molyviatis. The seasoned Defense Minister is Spilios Spiliotopoulos, while the Public
Order Minister, in charge of security for the Olympics, is the younger George
Voulgarakis.  There is only one woman minister, although Karamanlis named Anna
Pasroudha-Benaki to be Greece’s first woman Speaker of Parliament.  
The parties are now campaigning for the June 13 European Parliament election in
which ND is expected to increase its lead over PASOK.2  Karamanlis named former
Defense Minister Yiannis Varvitsiotis to head the ND ticket, with maverick former
Foreign Minister Antonis Samaras restored to the party in second place.  Papandreou’s
determination to transform PASOK is evident in his candidates who average 39 years of
age, 50% of whom are female, and are led by a 33-year-old woman labor union official.
Economy
Greece has a mixed capitalist economy, with the public sector accounting for half of
the gross domestic product (GDP).  Greece remains among the poorest of pre-May 1,
2004 enlargement European Union (EU) states, with 20% of the population living below
the poverty level as compared to an EU average of 15%.  The GDP growth rate for 2003
was 4.2%.  Per capita GDP is estimated at $19,100 (2002) or about 70% of the leading
euro-zone economies.3  Greece has experienced steady economic growth of an annual
average of 4% since 1997, exceeding the overall EU growth rate by more than 1 percent
due to reforms, EU aid, and the August 2004 summer Olympics, which has stimulated
investment.  Prime Minister Karamanlis hopes to stem an expected post-Olympics
slowdown with tax cuts and other measures to attract foreign investment. 
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7 U.S. State Department, Patterns of Global Terrorism 2003, released April 29, 2004.
The new ND government faces multiple challenges in reducing a large public debt
from 102.5% of GDP, a budget deficit of 2.7% of GDP, and unemployment of 9.5%.4  It
intends to accelerate privatization of state enterprises and institute reforms in the pension
and tax systems and the bureaucracy.  Karamanlis’s stated policy goals for the “Greece
of 2010” have financial and economic implications.  They are: investing in culture and
education, an overhaul and diminishment of the public sector, and the implementation of
an economic policy guaranteeing the acceleration of growth and a fair distribution of
wealth to all citizens.5
Olympics6
Karamanlis assumed personal responsibility for the 2004 summer Olympics by
donning the mantle of Minister of Culture as well as Prime Minister.  Faced with a deluge
of bad publicity about slowness in completing venues for sporting events and concern
about security preparations to deal with  possible terrorist threats, Greek officials compare
their preparations to a Greek folk dance that energizes near the end, and repeatedly give
assurances that venues will be completed and that the Olympics will be the safest ever.
The government has cancelled several projects (such as the roof on the swimming pool)
and curtailed some transportation infrastructure programs. The International Olympic
Committee (IOC) now believes that all venues will be ready on time.
Greek authorities have directed their security plans for the Olympics at possible
external terrorist threats. They contend that, since 2002, they have effectively dismantled
two domestic terrorist groups, the Revolutionary Organization 17 November (17N) and
Revolutionary Popular Struggle (ELA).  Neither group has been active in recent years.
U.S. officials, however, have not endorsed the Greeks’ conclusion regarding 17N and
ELA, citing Greek officials’ own references to continuing investigations.  There also are
many small anarchist groups operating mainly in the Athens area.  The State Department
cites anarchist attacks as evidence of “the lingering nature of left-wing terrorism in
Greece.”7 Although the main worry for the Olympics is Al Qaeda, its offshoots, and its
emulators, local anarchists have the potential to disrupt events, as they showed with three
bombings at an Athens police station on May 5.
The Greek government plans to field a security force of 70,000 for the Olympics.
It formed an international advisory group of seven countries, including the United States,
and requested assistance from NATO.  It also contracted with the private U.S.-based
Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC) to head an international
consortium providing security infrastructure. 
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Foreign Policy
Prime Minister Karamanlis maintains that Greece has a bipartisan foreign policy and
that he will make no strategic changes from the policies of PASOK, only tactical ones.
As an EU member, Greece will remain oriented toward Brussels and take many of its
foreign policy cues from the main EU players, notably France and Germany. Greece also
is a member of  NATO.  
Cyprus.8  In November 2002, U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan offered a draft
settlement plan to unite Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots in a loosely federated
United Republic of Cyprus.  U.N. Special Envoy Alvaro de Soto then oversaw
negotiations between the parties and revised the plan several times.  Annan had hoped that
the process would culminate in  four-party talks among Greece, Turkey, Greek Cypriots,
and Turkish Cypriots in Switzerland at the end of March 2004.  Although Karamanlis
traveled to Switzerland to show his “cooperation,” he did not participate in four-party
talks.  Instead, Annan and his team consulted all four leaders before finalizing the plan
on March 31. Karamanlis then appeared to hesitate about taking a  position before the
April 24 referenda on the Annan plan on Cyprus.  Reportedly under pressure from the
U.N., EU, and the United States, all of which favored the plan, Karamanlis made a
cautious statement on April 15,  concluding that the plan had more positive points than
“difficulties.”  He said that it was up to the Cypriot people to decide and that Greece
would support their decision.  In contrast, PASOK leader Papandreou gave early and
unambiguous support to the plan and urged the Greek Cypriots to accept it.  Aside from
his stated concerns about the substance of the plan, Karamanlis may have felt constrained
by (Greek) Cypriot President Tassos Papadopoulos’s vociferous opposition to the plan,
by polls showing that Greek Cypriots overwhelmingly agreed with their president, by
opposition from Greek nationalists within and outside of ND, and by political calculations
regarding the June European Parliament elections.  In the referenda, Greek Cypriots
overwhelmingly rejected the Annan plan, while Turkish Cypriots accepted it.  Karamanlis
has since said that  reunification of Cyprus remains Greece’s objective and has consulted
Annan about the next steps to take. 
Turkey.  Prime Minister Karamanlis has vowed to continue the rapprochement with
Turkey begun in 1999.  Before taking office, Karamanlis had forged a personal
relationship with Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan as fellow members of
the European People’s Party (EPP), a grouping of European conservative political parties.
Karamanlis has characterized the relationship as one of “mutual trust.”9  Greece believes
that a European Turkey will not be a threat, so Karamanlis has said that he will promote
Turkey’s accession to the EU.  Karamanlis’s commitment to sustaining good relations
with Turkey despite developments on Cyprus transforms traditional Greek policy toward
Turkey, which had posited a Cyprus settlement as a precondition for  rapprochement.
Erdogan made an official visit to Greece from May 6-8, 2004, the first by a Turkish prime
minister in 16 years.  Karamanlis has allowed exploratory talks on Aegean issues and
bilateral committees on ‘low-level’ issues, initiated under PASOK, to  continue. The two
sides have openly recognized that rapprochement has diminished their mutual threat
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perceptions and have discussed reciprocal cuts in defense spending.  They also share an
interest in boosting bilateral trade, which stands at $1.2 billion annually.
“Macedonia” Dispute.10  The former Yugoslav republic of Macedonia declared
its independence in 1991, following other former Yugoslav republics.  Its territory covers
39% of the historic region of Macedonia.  The remaining 51% is in Greece and 9% is in
Bulgaria. “Macedonia” asserts its right to use and be recognized by its constitutional
name, the Republic of Macedonia.  Greece objects, claiming that the name “Macedonia”
usurps Greece’s heritage and conveys irredentist ambitions against the region of northern
Greece bordering the former Yugoslav republic, which is also called “Macedonia.”  In the
early 1990’s, the name issue inflamed Greek nationalism and public opinion. The
Republic of Macedonia entered the U.N. in 1992 under the  provisional name of The
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM). Perceived compromises on the
name issue weakened the last ND Prime Minister, Costas Mitsotakis, who was defeated
in the parliamentary elections of 1993. 
 In 1995, Athens and Skopje signed a bilateral agreement that normalized relations,
and settled all outstanding disputes except for the name. Greece also ended its trade
blockade.  Since then, diplomats from both governments have met under U.N. auspices
to discuss the name issue, but no mutually acceptable solution has been reached. U.S.
diplomat Matthew Nimetz acts as the U.N. Secretary General’s personal envoy in these
talks.  Karamanlis has called on Skopje to show “greater flexibility” to achieve progress
in resolving the name dispute. Despite the lack of a resolution, Greek companies have
made considerable investments in the FYROM and Greece supports the FYROM’s
ambitions to join the EU and NATO.
 The Karamanlis government may not be prepared to make concessions needed for
a resolution until it  consolidates its position.   An expelled ND member leads a small,
extreme nationalist party, the Popular Orthodox Rally (LAOS), and may exploit the issue.
Other ardent nationalists remain in ND ranks, and Karamanlis probably would not want
to risk alienating them over an issue that is not pressing.  For its part, the Skopje
government also has to contend with nationalist forces at home and may not be able to
compromise.  At the same time, observers believe that a resolution of the dispute is long
overdue. The trend in international usage favors the FYROM, with international actors
commonly and officially using the shorthand “Macedonia” in lieu of the more
cumbersome FYROM.  For example, on the occasion of the death of President Trajkovski
in a plane crash, the U.S. House of Representatives passed H.Res. 540, on March 11,
2004, by a vote of 411-0, expressing solidarity with the people of Macedonia and the
government of Macedonia (neither with quotes). 
Relations with the United States. U.S.-Greek bilateral relations are good,
based on historical, political, cultural, military, economic, and personal ties.  Prime
Minister Karamanlis visited President Bush at the White House on May 20, and
reaffirmed the strength of the bond.  There are about 1.1 million Americans of Greek
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origin; they and their offspring total almost 3 million and form a well-organized
community which advocates pro-Greek positions and close U.S.-Greek relations.  The
United States has a trade surplus with Greece, but accounts for only a very small share of
Greece’s imports.  The Greek government has closely consulted with U.S. agencies
regarding security for the Olympics, including the National Security Council, and the
Departments of State, Justice (FBI), Homeland Security, and Energy, and the CIA.  
The Greek government responded to the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the
United States with strong political support, unimpeded U.S. and coalition use of Greek
airspace, and military assets for counterterrorism.  As of March 2004, there were 167
Greek troops participating in the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in
Afghanistan as part of the NATO mission there.  This figure is down from more than
1,300 troops and support elements from the Greek Corps of Engineers and two Greek C-
130 aircraft deployed during Operation Enduring Freedom, the war to oust the Taliban
and Al Qaeda from Afghanistan.  Until July 2003, Greece also stationed a navy frigate in
the Arabian Sea.  Due to the need for security forces for the Olympics, Greece has told
NATO that it cannot increase its military presence in Afghanistan. Like many other EU
countries, Greece does not view the war in Iraq as part of the global war against terror,
and it has no troops among coalition forces there.  It supports a greater U.N. role to
legitimize the international presence in Iraq and to help determine its future.
Greece and the United States share  interests in stability in southeastern Europe.  The
United States has welcomed and encouraged the rapprochement between Greece and
Turkey.  Both Greece and Turkey participate in the U.S.-initiated Southeast Europe
Brigade (SEEBRIG), a rapid reaction force consisting of contingents from seven regional
countries. Greece contributed a transport company to the NATO Stabilization Force in
Bosnia-Herzegovina (SFOR), although its participation ended in 2003.    Greece sent 400
troops to participate in NATO’s Operation Essential Harvest to demilitarize rebel forces
in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), and then contributed forces
to NATO’s Task Force Fox to provide security for civilian personnel overseeing
implementation of the peace plan in the FYROM.  NATO concluded this operation in
2003.  Greek troops continue to serve in NATO’s peacekeeping force in Kosovo (KFOR).
At the same time, there is a strong strain of anti-Americanism in Greece, stemming
from U.S. support for the Greek military junta that ruled from 1967-1974.  Unsupported
allegations of U.S. involvement in Greek internal political affairs surface regularly.  Anti-
American sentiment was strong during the wars in the Balkans in the 1990s, when Greeks
sympathized with their traditional allies and co-religionists, the Serbs, and has surfaced
again since the war in Iraq.  Anti-American feelings are evident in periodic mass
demonstrations mobilized by Communists, anarchists, unions, antiwar activists, and anti-
globalization forces, whose influence is disproportionate to their numbers in society.
Greek commentators carefully note that anti-Americanism in Greece is targeted against
U.S. government policies and not the American people, partly because there is some
concern that perceptions of anti-Americanism might affect Greece’s vital tourism
industry.
